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ARTICLE

EXPLAINING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
IRINA D. MANTA †
This symposium piece first seeks to unpack the relationship between
intellectual property infringement and property offenses, and then to
understand how the connection between the two has informed when the
former is criminalized. The piece examines the porous nature of the
boundary line between intangible and tangible resources, showing the
at-times uncomfortable fit of the non-rivalrous label to intellectual
property. An analysis of the respective harms of the two types of
violations follows. This symposium contribution shows how lawmakers
have treated patents differently from other forms of intellectual property
by choosing not to criminalize their infringement, due both to utilitarian
reasons and public choice rationales. While historically the entities who
pushed for harsher sanctions for copyright violations in particular have
often not encountered resistance, a combination of large tech
companies’ and grassroots organizations’ activism has thwarted
attempts at strengthened enforcement in recent times. The political
landscape of copyright lawmaking, however, may be on its way to the
greater degree of equipoise between support and opposition to greater
sanctions that one observes in the patent legislative context.
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Director of the Hofstra Center for Intellectual Property Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law
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a part, of the Eighth Annual Tri-State Region Intellectual Property Workshop at the New York
University School of Law, and of the Intellectual Property in the Trees workshop at Lewis &
Clark University Law School. I also owe a debt of gratitude for support to the St. John’s
University School of Law, and the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University and
its faculty workshop, as well as to my research assistant Matthew Nevola.
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INTRODUCTION 1
The criminal law is frequently a last resort when other methods of
resolution have failed. When an individual engages in anti-social
behavior, his victim and bystanders might begin by reasoning with him
one-on-one. As a next step, the community would take measures, a
mixture of carrots and sticks, perhaps involving ostracism. If the
problem is of sufficient gravity, the civil court system might intervene,
providing a forum for the victim to seek official redress in the form of
making the perpetrator cease his behavior and, in some cases, provide
reparations for past wrongs. Punishing crime is expensive and forces the
government, and hence the public, to pay in exchange for greater safety,
retribution, and deterrence of both the specific offender and potential
future wrongdoers.
We traditionally associate criminal law with offenses that involve the
use of force against people and things. If you try to kill me, it would
likely be unwise for me to rely on trying to reason with you afterwards
or assume that ostracism alone will prevent you from doing so in the
future. While a monetary fine might provide some reparation to me, it
is unlikely to do so fully, and the fear of such fines may not be enough
to assure society that you will not come after me or another potential
victim down the line. The same is true for many property-based
offenses. After all, every time you consider stealing something, there is
1
Portions of this piece have been adapted from Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal
Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2011)
[hereinafter “Manta, Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions”] and Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low
Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157 (2014).
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a chance that you will not get caught. So you may well conclude from a
cost-benefit calculation that you may as well give it another shot and
pay a fine the percentage of the time that you do get nabbed. At the end
of the day, as criminal law scholar Erin Sheley summarized in short,
“[b]oth criminal and tort law can be said to redress a form of wrong.” 2
The criminal justice system relies on a mix of retribution, denunciation,
utilitarian, and other moral factors (some of which stand in tension with
each other). 3
Turning our attention to intellectual property offenses specifically,
the rationale for criminal sanctions in that area—which are available for
some forms of infringement in copyright, trademarks, and trade
secrets—is not immediately obvious. The need for a legal rather than
extra-legal response is, in itself, not a mystery. Intellectual property
infringers often have little to no direct interaction with their victims, and
so interpersonal negotiations or community responses would generally
not yield much by way of redress. It therefore makes intuitive sense why
an IP owner would need to turn to the civil court system for help. Why
would legislators, however, at times enact criminal laws to respond to
this kind of non-violent offense? The answer turns on both utilitarian
factors and the public choice landscape of U.S. politics. To understand
both of these facets, it is useful to begin with an examination of how
analogies to property offenses have historically led to the
criminalization of some forms of intellectual property infringement.
Part I of this symposium piece explains the relationship between
intellectual property infringement and property violations such as theft,
which includes a discussion of the relative harms that different kinds of
infringement impose as compared to the harms inflicted as connected to
tangible property. Part II shows why patents have been treated
differently in the context of criminal law, both as a matter of utilitarian
concern and public choice rationale. Part III discusses what happens
when intellectual property owners, such as in the case of copyright, push
too far and eventually a popular backlash results. The piece ends in a
brief Conclusion section.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND PROPERTY OFFENSES
This Part describes the development of the concept of theft as it
applies to intellectual property infringement. It then analyzes the harms
2
Erin L. Sheley, Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea, 97 N.C.
L. REV. 773, 812 (2019).
3
See id. at 812-813.
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of intellectual property infringement to advance a clearer understanding
of the ways in which that label does or does not fit, and how there may
be more applicable analogies in the realm of property law violations.
Examining property offenses in a more nuanced way shows that
intellectual property and its infringement may transcend the usual
binary of rivalrousness or lack thereof. A broader understanding of
rivalrousness than one based on mere physical use allows for goods and
their infringement to lie on a spectrum of rivalrousness. Offenses such
as vandalism and trespass have implicitly long recognized the
possibility of that spectrum.
A. How the Intellectual Property Infringer Became a Thief
Defining even the theft of tangible property turns out to be remarkably
fraught in the first place. Legal dictionaries speak of the “felonious taking
and removing of another’s personal property with the intent of depriving
the true owner of it.” 4 Problems abound in understanding what makes
property someone’s own (that which may not be stolen, is the circular
answer), what it means to take it, how we determine intent in this context,
and what form of deprivation qualifies. Regardless of these theoretical
problems, ancient societies felt little compunction punishing theft, which
they perceived as an attack against God’s will and for which they were
willing to award the death penalty. 5 While most countries have eliminated
the death penalty for acts involving deprivations of property, 6 they have
retained a variety of other harsh criminal punishments such as
imprisonment.
The application of similar principles to intangible resources both
accompanied and reinforced in turn the propertization of IP. As intellectual
property increased in value, often much outpacing in the business context
what the brick-and-mortar assets were worth, the stakes grew higher
around IP infringement as well as around the regime addressing its
deterrence and punishment. 7 Once the barrier had been cleared to use
criminal sanctions in this context, the question regarding its particular
applications changed from “whether” to “when”. This has, to some extent,
paralleled the general expansion of criminal law in the punishment of
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1615 (9th ed. 2009).
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Thomas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card
Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (2008).
6
China remains an exception. See, e.g., CORNELL CENTER ON THE DEATH PENALTY
WORLDWIDE, DEATH PENALTY DATABASE: CHINA (2014),
https://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=China.
7
GERALDINE SZOTT MOOHR, JACQUELINE LIPTON & IRINA MANTA, THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 2D (2016).
4
5
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property-related offenses, where the list of actionable violations
transitioned from violent crimes like robbery to non-violent ones like
larceny.
Intellectual property infringement does not meet the strictest dictionary
definitions of theft because an IP owner is virtually never completely
deprived of a good. That owner’s complaint tends to be that her intangible
goods have experienced an often-significant reduction in value as a result
of the infringement rather than that she has lost the ability to use the goods
in a literal sense. I have argued that this strengthens the case for an
understanding of intellectual property infringement as vandalism (defined
as an act that involves some degree of damage to the property) or trespass
(in cases of unauthorized access that did not necessarily result in damage)
rather than theft. 8 Suffice it to say here, however, that an understanding of
intellectual property infringement as some form of property offense—
whatever the particular offense may be—contains the elements of basic
legitimacy, and that arguments against the use of criminal sanctions in the
context of intangible goods would do better not to place overly great
reliance on the distinctions between IP and property.
Indeed, as I and others have argued, even the old chestnut that
characterizes intellectual property as non-rivalrous does not hold up to
closer scrutiny. 9 The traditional definition of non-rivalrousness as
pertaining to things that cannot be used by two people simultaneously is
unhelpfully formalistic. The real question which we have to confront in
daily life is whether one person’s enjoyment of a good conflicts with
another’s enjoyment. As a matter of utility, be it economic, hedonic, or of
any other sort, that is ultimately the relevant consideration. Once one
accepts that definition, many different examples in intellectual property
come to mind that involve no physical inability for a good to be shared,
but rather a conflict in its enjoyment. For one, this can occur in the context
of luxury trademarked goods. 10 Wearing a Gucci purse feels less special if
too many people have one (worse, at some point one may be mistaken for
a user of counterfeit goods oneself—which is very different from the
image many Gucci purse wearers want to portray). 11 In the copyright
context, the distribution of a surreptitiously-made recording of an
8
See Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property Infringement as
Vandalism, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331 (2015).
9
See Irina D. Manta, Keeping IP Real, HOUSTON L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with
author); Manta & Wagner, supra note 8, at 338; James Y. Stern, Intellectual Property and the
Myth of Nonrivalry (on file with author).
10
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. XV § 1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178-79 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006 & Supp. 112008)).
11
See Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 248-49 (2013).
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exclusive concert at the Met potentially detracts from the experience for
which live spectators paid dearly. 12
This goes much beyond the case of luxury trademarked goods and their
copyright equivalents, however. One of the charges made explicitly or
implicitly against those who rail about illegal streaming/downloading of
their intellectual property, be it in the form of songs or movies or the like,
is that they are greedy. As long as some people buy goods legally, does it
really matter that Game of Thrones episodes are routinely streamed
without payment? The answer is two-fold. First, illegal streaming or
downloading can have a tendency to snowball. Many users who would
normally stream for payment may become resentful of doing so when
others receive the good for free. The legal users may in fact feel like they
are not just subsidizing free-riders, but that they are paying much higher
prices than they would but for the illegal streamers. The underlying theory
is that at least some of the illegal streamers would pay for Game of Thrones
if the choice was between paying and not watching the episodes at all. The
money that this set of users refuses to pay can drive up prices for what is
left of the population that streams legally.
The second, related point in such cases is that the producer has put out
a good that is desired by a significant number of people, but she receives
proportionally little value in return. For one, this may feel disheartening
and demoralizing even outside of economic questions. The producers of
artistic works, in particular, often think that they have infused these works
with their hearts and souls, and it can be troublesome to have large groups
of individuals essentially say that this intellectual property is good enough
to be consumed for free but not good enough to spend a few dollars on.
The reality is that virtually anyone who wanted to watch Game of Thrones
was legally able to wait until a season ended, purchase an HBO Now pass
for one month at $14.99, and watch a full season in that month (each season
only had between six and ten episodes). 13 This is not an unbearable cost
for most fans, and yet a large number chose not to pay it.
Despite a number of measures to prevent it, illegal streaming persists,
and it is fair to assume—as mentioned above—that at least some
percentage of the individuals involved would be willing to pay for the
goods if this costless alternative did not exist. Just like with the nonrivalrousness aspect specifically, a more flexible approach as to whether
intellectual property infringement can be likened to property offenses
generally makes sense. Leaving aside some of the matters regarding
sentimental value of goods that come up in the case of personal property,
12
13

See Manta & Wagner, supra note 8, at 338.
See HBO, https://www.hbo.com/order (last accessed Apr. 14, 2019).
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most situations involving theft or vandalism of tangible property produce
negative consequences for the owner because she loses all or part of the
value of her property. The physical loss or damage, while non-negligible,
does not tend to be the central feature of the event. If a malicious neighbor
tramples down and destroys potatoes I just grew, I can no longer sell them
(or not at the same price). Similarly, if I sell my music for a living, illegal
downloading of the music may eventually hamper my ability to sell my
goods.
This will not always occur. For example, some people may choose to
buy my music legally after initial illegal downloads. Indeed, in specific
cases listeners may encounter my music through such downloads who
otherwise would not have bothered taking the financial risk of purchasing
it without testing. Also, artists make their revenues through a number of
different avenues. A singer could witness a cut in profits via illegal
downloads that is compensated through later increased sale of concert
tickets and official merchandise. The empirics behind some of these
tradeoffs are highly uncertain and context-dependent, however, and one
might query why the illegal downloaders (and/or those who offer those
goods) rather than the artist herself should be the ones to make the decision
of how a work should be sold or given away in the marketplace.
The artist always has the option to distribute the good for free, or to ask
for voluntary donations—indeed, Radiohead did just that a dozen years
ago when it released an album on the Internet that anyone could download
and pay a price of their choice. 14 The same is true of the potato farmer. He
can decide how much of his agricultural goods to distribute at no cost as a
matter of marketing (imagine a cooked version as a free sample at a
farmer’s market) or good will. Some farms control their distribution
strictly, while others including a number of apple-picking farms and the
like assume that they can give buyers some discretion when it comes to
sampling goods and that in the end, the total purchases made will
financially justify earlier investments in offering samples.
Musical artists have so many different ways to offer samples, however,
that it is not clear why whole-hog free downloading of their entire albums
will be in the interest of most artists. They can allow listeners to hear the
first thirty seconds of some or all songs, or they can make a few songs
available for free while expecting purchase before a listener can have
access to the entire album. Just like we do not expect potato farmers to
allow potential buyers to take bites out of every potato before purchase, it
is unrealistic to expect that most artists can or should be able to afford
14
Josh Tyrangiel, Radiohead Says: Pay What You Want, TIME (Oct. 1, 2007),
http://content.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1666973,00.html.
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having large numbers of people consume their goods for free to encourage
sales.
B. The Harms of Intellectual Property Infringement Juxtaposed with
Those of Property Crimes
Criminal law is generally supposed to be used in the case of conduct
involving nontrivial harm and wrongful conduct.15 As discussed above, both
property and intellectual property offenses reduce the wealth of owners and
provide disincentives for further investments. One distinction in this context
between property and IP offenses is that property crimes have a greater
potential for endangering victims’ sense of physical safety. IP infringers
generally operate remotely, working behind a computer screen or at a
different facility, unlike thieves and vandals that often personally intrude on
one’s space.
A reason that has been given for why criminal sanctions are more
justified for property offenses than IP ones is that we must place greater
emphasis on protecting the bodily integrity of victims than on punishing
financial loss, and a thief of tangible goods could suddenly attack if a victim
caught her in the act, or violence could ensue when the victim tries to protect
his property (including potentially through the use of weapons). The law
does not view this distinction as crucial for culpability even within property
offenses, however, and someone can land in jail for improperly wiring
money out of someone else’s account, which is an offense that would also
not present the potential for violent clashes as such.
On the issue of wrongfulness, convictions both in the property and
intellectual property contexts generally require evidence of intent. 16 The
particular level of wrongfulness differs in each scenario, but it is safe to
assume that offenders who are criminally convicted in both the property and
IP worlds usually have a high level of awareness of the illegality of their
conducts.
American courts have frequently recognized informally the relationship
between the two types of offenses, especially when they have referred to IP
infringers’ actions as “intellectual property theft” or “piracy”. The Supreme
Court has not expressed its views on the subject directly. The closest it came
was in Dowling v. United States, where it ruled that the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA) that criminalized the interstate transportation of stolen
property did not extend to bootleg records. 17 The Court called a copyrighted
15
See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
103-19 (2008).
16
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 220.1-.3 (1962).
17
473 U.S. 207 (1985).
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good “no ordinary chattel” and emphasized the inability of infringers to take
over physical control of copyright or completely to deprive the owner of the
ability to use it.18 As is apparent from multiple statements in the opinion, the
Court was concerned about interfering with congressional intent and pointed
out that 1) Congress could have explicitly included copyright in the NSPA if
it wished to do so and 2) the NSPA could be used as a tool to criminalize
trademark infringement (when Congress had known to legislate in this area
separately shortly before, in the narrow context of counterfeiting) and even
patent infringement (which Congress has not done to this day). 19 Justice
Powell argued in dissent that the NSPA does in fact cover the transportation
of bootlegs, an act that he described as involving the offenses of theft,
unauthorized use, and conversion. 20
The subsequent judicial history is muddled, with lower courts
distinguishing Dowling in a number of cases and referring explicitly to
infringed intellectual property as having been “stolen”. While lower courts’
inconsistent application of Dowling could be explained by (willful or
innocent) mistake or by the statutory changes to the NSPA to include the
transmission of some forms of data, 21 it may also evidence an understanding
on the part of the lower courts that Dowling did not truly reject the
possibility that theft and conversion of intangible assets can occur.
In short, and while a final pronouncement by the Supreme Court remains
to be heard, the parallels between the harms of intellectual property
infringement and those of a number of property crimes are striking. IP
infringement can partially or almost completely destroy the value of a good
and reduce the incentives for productive behavior just like property crimes
do. The criminal law also tends to demand willfulness before punishing
either type of conduct. On the other hand, IP infringement is generally more
remote and hence does not tend to interfere directly with the safety of
owners. Further, complete deprivation of a good does not usually occur in
the IP context. Last, on average, IP infringement may be less wrongful than
property offenses because the boundaries of IP are less clearly delineated
and hence accidental illegal conduct is more likely. As a result, courts must
pay special attention to whether IP infringers genuinely had the mens rea
necessary to meet criminal statutory definitions.

Id. at 216.
See id. at 220-27.
20
Id. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
21
See, e.g., United States v. Farraj, 142 F. Supp. 2d 484, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United
States v. Alavi, No. CR07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1971391, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2008).
But see United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
Dowling decision removed all intangible property from the purview of the NSPA).
18
19
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II. THE NOT-SO-CURIOUS CASE OF PATENTS
There is a noticeable gap in the criminal law framework that deals
with intellectual property infringement, which is that it does not cover
patent infringement. The roots of this predicament can be found in a
combination of 1) utilitarian and other moral considerations and 2)
public choice explanations. This Section will focus on the differences
between the various branches of intellectual property, the relative ease
of infringing on a large scale in these regimes, the possibility of using
tools other than criminal law to lower infringement levels, and the
respective risks of overdeterrence.
The first question is, again, the one of harm. Inventors and other
patent owners have complained at times that the sanctions imposed on
infringers are insufficient, and that the process of civil litigation to
vindicate rights in this context is really expensive. Indeed, “[p]atent
litigation in district court typically costs millions of dollars.” 22 One can
surmise from patent owners’ willingness to spend such sums that they
have a high level of faith in their legal claims and that they perceive the
harm they experience as large enough to invest millions into recovery.
Criminal actions against infringers could reduce civil litigation costs
both by shifting some enforcement costs to the government and reducing
the amount of infringement via deterrence mechanisms. The question at
that point becomes whether this would promote innovation. This could
occur because criminal sanctions reduce the costs of enforcing patents
and provide a signal to inventors that society values them as much as it
does copyright and trademark owners. Patent infringers may also be
sensitive to being called thieves and criminals, and so this would
increase the personal costs of infringing patents.
While this idea holds some appeal at first blush, the differences
between patents and other forms of intellectual property cause
significant problems in this context. First, even though the process to
obtain patents is time-consuming and expensive, 23 a large percentage of
litigated patents are ultimately deemed invalid. 24 While the patent term
is shorter than that for other types of IP protection (twenty years for
22
John F. Duffy, Standing to Challenge Patents, Enforcement Risk, and Separation of
Powers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 644 (2015).
23
The application costs for a patent (including fees paid to the PTO and attorneys) are
estimated at about $20,000. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How, Innovation
Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 396 (2009); see also Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2001) (estimating
application costs at “$10,000 to $30,000 per patent”).
24
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).

2019] EXPLAINING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 26

patents versus seventy years plus life of the author for copyright, and
versus indefinite duration while the mark is in use for trademarks),
patents provide the greatest level of excludability of these different
forms of IP. Reverse engineering and independent invention do not
provide defenses to a claim of patent infringement. 25 In contrast,
copyright allows for an independent creation defense as well as the
obligation on the part of the copyright owner to accept fair use of her
works and compulsory licensing in some contexts. 26 For trademarks,
owners have to let other parties use their marks unless it is done
commercially and leads to consumer confusion, dilution, or a few other
illicit outcomes. 27
This means that the law is already rather intolerant of any use of
patented material, and that on top of it, it is not always clear which
patents are valid at all. The criminal law must provide proper notice to
the public and define mens rea precisely, but defining willfulness in
patent infringement for criminal purposes creates risks. Due to recent
developments in the law, the current standard for willfulness to obtain
enhanced civil damages is to some extent unsettled, but it may amount
to an “egregiousness” requirement. 28 Because this standard has not
really been tested, or clarified, in civil cases due to its novelty, it is
difficult to determine whether it would be workable in the criminal
context. As a general matter, it is easy to see how analyzing mens rea in
patent infringement could prove quite confusing to the average criminal
jury that may struggle with the subject matter of patents in the first
place. It seems easier, to some extent, to justify criminal sanctions in
contexts in which 1) willfulness can and is established conclusively and
2) the invention was such that there was little to no doubt that the patent
itself was valid.
Both setting too high and too low a threshold for criminal
prosecution in the patent context presents problems. If the bar is high,
and large amounts of hard-to-obtain evidence are required to prove
willfulness, prosecutors may not want to take the chance of bringing
cases frequently at all, and even when they do, they may not succeed.
This would reduce the upsides of having such sanctions because
infringers may continue to proceed undeterred if there is much to gain
25
The issue of exclusive use in different forms of IP is covered in Brian M. Hoffstadt,
Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 909, 951-52 (2007).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Elecs., 136 S.Ct. 1923 (2016).
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from infringement and the chance of actually being caught and
prosecuted is minimal. Meanwhile, a low bar could over-deter
innovation if individuals who do not wish to take the risk of
incarceration or other criminal sanctions choose to stay out of the
invention business altogether or work in areas that produce less useful
inventions for the public. Ultimately, the realistic goal cannot be to
reduce the level of patent infringement to zero because that is likely
impossible without costs so severe to innovation that a cost-benefit
analysis could not justify doing so.
Additionally, willful infringement can benefit society if it forces the
examination of improperly granted patents that stand in the way of
innovation. 29 In the copyright and trademark contexts, it is less often the
case that willful infringement results in information as to whether
owners properly received protection in the first place. 30 In a further
difference, any overdeterrence that occurs in the patent context could
prove more dangerous than overdeterrence for copyrights and
trademarks. In trademarks, a new producer could probably still find a
mark of some sort to use even if it is sub-optimal. In copyright, some
artistic works may not be created or distributed. 31 While that can be
problematic, the consequences in the patent world are far worse if whole
classes of technology and perhaps even some life-saving medicines
never see the light of day due to overdeterrence. On top of that, it is
possible that in at least some cases, criminal sanctions already exist for
patent infringement through indirect means, such as if a pharmaceutical
drug infringer also engages in counterfeiting of the original trademark
attached to the drug. 32 In such cases, the marginal benefit of having
criminal sanctions for the patent infringement portion specifically may
be low.

29
Multiple scholars have noted that society suffers when civil patent lawsuits are settled if
bad patents that block “very useful or valuable” technology are allowed to continue existing as
a result. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237,
244 (2006).
30
Indeed, it is patents specifically that are often improvidently granted, and patent
infringement lawsuits are a tool to uncover that. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. I
would like to thank Jacqueline Lipton for our conversation on this topic.
31
See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 760 (2003) (“Fear
of criminal penalties may inhibit second-generation creators from working with material they
believe may be off-limits—even when such use is in fact lawful.”).
32
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Distributor of Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Drugs
Sentenced (Jan. 15, 2009), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalccips/legacy/2012/03/15/XuSent.pdf.
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Differences in the type of infringement we see in the patent context
versus the copyright and trademark worlds likely also account for the
lack of criminal sanctions in patents. First, most cases of patent
infringement do not appear to involve copying or willfulness, so it is
unclear to what extent intentional infringement—the type that the
criminal law would punish—represents a significant problem in the
United States. 33 When it comes to the other forms of intellectual
property, and especially copyright, relatively modern technologies had
a significant impact on increased levels of infringement, including
specifically intentional infringement. The ability to reproduce with
exactitude copyrighted materials and distribute them broadly exploded
through the advent of the Internet. 34 Some have argued that this has
come at a large loss to the U.S. economy as a matter of revenue and
jobs. 35 Meanwhile, the sale of some types of goods, such as counterfeit
pharmaceutical drugs distributed over the Internet, can cause grave
health risks and be difficult to detect. 36 In most more innocuous cases,
the victims of counterfeiting are dispersed and their respective financial
losses low enough that they are unlikely to go after counterfeiters
themselves. 37 Criminal prosecutions can address that problem by having
the government seek to protect these victims in a single action. 38 In the
case of copyright infringers, it is the infringers that are often dispersed,
such as in peer-to-peer sharing contexts. Criminal sanctions against the
biggest offenders are thought to deter future bad actors and to cost less
than broad civil litigation. 39 Copyright infringers also often do not have

33
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34
See DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF
CYBERSPACE 202 (2009).
35
See 138 CONG. REC. 31,182 (1992); H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 3; STEPHEN E. SIWEK,
INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY PIRACY TO THE
U.S. ECONOMY 14 (2007), https://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_CopyrightPiracy.pdf. But
see Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright
Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 397-98 (2003) (criticizing these figures as vastly
overstating the losses to U.S. copyright owners).
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Economic Realities and Other Related Issues, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 545, 550-51 (2006).
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Counterfeiting, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998).
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(weighing the utilitarian pros and cons of criminalizing copyright infringement, including in
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much income, and so it is difficult to recover against them even if a civil
lawsuit proves successful. 40
The advent of the Internet has not affected patent infringement
figures in the same way. And patent infringers tend to be large
companies that do have the financial resources to pay for damage
awards in civil lawsuits, 41 which means that corporations have a serious
financial incentive not to infringe that lower-means individuals in other
IP contexts may lack. 42 Further, patent infringement is not as woven into
the fabric of our society as trademark and copyright infringement.
Counterfeiting can affect the economic and even physical well-being of
individuals. Copyright infringement can include regular people and
potentially desensitize them to committing other forms of legal
violations. Because patent infringement largely occurs between
corporations, it is unlikely to have these effects. These factors make
criminal sanctions less justifiable in the patent context than for
copyright and trademarks.
Some of the development of the law, and of the differences between
patent law on the one hand and copyright/trademark law on the other,
can be traced back to public choice factors rather than utilitarian or
moral rationales, however. The Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) repeatedly pushed for increased criminal sanctions over the
years because they thought that civil sanctions or insufficiently harsh
criminal laws were not enough to deter infringement. 43 These
organizations managed to expand which acts would count as felonies
under the law and how high the monetary fines and prison sentence

40
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11:26 AM), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-riaa-paidits-lawyers.html.
41
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L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000).
42
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intellectual property infringement. This is especially true because some of the most blatant
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CRIMINOLOGY 1470, 1478-79 (1997) (citing Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of
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maxima would run. 44 Lobbying is a logical act as a matter of self-interest
on the part of the RIAA, MPAA, and various other organizations. Large
copyright owners tend to be frequent victims of copyright infringement
and most do not commit great amounts of infringement themselves.
These owners have to spend significant sums to pursue their claims in
court, often do not recover much money, and, as discussed, experience
that civil sanctions may not prove as effective a deterrent as criminal
penalties. 45 Trademark owners are also generally organized to favor
harsher laws because they tend to be the victims rather than perpetrators
of infringement.
There is some historical evidence to suggest that the United States
and other governments have better insulated the patent system from
lobbying. 46 That said, patent lobbies can be powerful, in part because
most people are fairly indifferent as to how their Congressmen vote in
the context of patent laws. What has kept sanctions in check regardless,
however, is that large pharmaceutical companies have tended to favor
large sanctions while information technology (IT) firms have gone
against that trend. 47 Unlike big pharma, IT corporations are likely to find
themselves accused of patent infringement rather than just being its
victims. 48 Hence, they often do not wish to expose themselves to the risk
of greater liability that harsher laws would cause. 49 Over the long term,
changes in the relative power of the pharmaceutical versus IT industries
could influence the level of patent enforcement and associated sanctions
that we see. 50
Technological changes could also affect the calculus and Congress’s
willingness to pass criminal sanctions for patent infringement. One of
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the most salient examples in this context is the advent of 3D printing, 51
whose potential to increase opportunities for trademark violations I have
noted previously. 52 This technology has the potential to disrupt
intellectual property as we know it because users can share computeraided design (CAD) files digitally that would enable users from all over
the world to infringe on patented inventions as long as they have the
necessary raw materials and printer. 53 Should this start occurring on a
large scale, patent owners would quite likely band together to encourage
and lobby Congress to pass more punitive legislation, including quite
possibly criminal sanctions.
III. BACKLASH TO HARSH SANCTIONS
Even when IP owners manage to get harsh laws passed that carry hefty
civil damages or criminal sanctions with them, the possibility of later
upheaval by the population remains. This is particularly true in the
copyright context, in part because such a large percentage of American
Internet users has engaged in some degree of infringement. 54 The public
reaction was galvanized by the sky-high civil damages that copyright
owners obtained against Boston University student Joel Tenenbaum and
Minnesota mom Jammie Thomas-Rasset, who would each come to owe
hundreds of thousands of dollars for illegal downloading. 55 While such
high sanctions, according to scholarly work on the subject, appear to have
some effect on deterring future illegal downloads, the effects are
temporary and illicit behavior tends to resume eventually. 56
Many people had not necessarily paid much attention to intellectual
property legislation in the pre-Internet era, but grassroots efforts took hold
and ultimately defeated the bills for the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in
the House of Representatives 57 and for the Preventing Real Online Threats
51
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2019); Lucas Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits
and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553 (2014).
52
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Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 604 (2009).
55
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87, 121 (D. Mass. 2010).
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to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PIPA, or
also PROTECT IP Act) in the Senate. 58 These bills would have enabled
the possibility of court orders to thwart advertisers and banks from
engaging in financial dealings with infringing websites, as well as of court
orders that could make Internet Service Providers (ISPs) prevent access to
websites or make search engines like Google and their brethren block links
to infringing sites. 59 SOPA also came with criminal sanctions that included
up to five years’ imprisonment for anyone who illegally streamed
copyrighted works. 60
Online petitions garnered millions of signatures, and websites like
Wikipedia and Reddit rose up in protest. 61 Others such as Google, Flickr,
and Mozilla soon joined. Unlike in many previous contexts, large
copyright owners did not unite in the effort to pass SOPA/PIPA, and
Silicon Valley proved to be an opponent to the entertainment world for the
first time. 62 The combination of angered Internet users and pushback from
several major corporations proved fatal to the bills even though those bills
did not plan to change the actual substance of intellectual property law.
The inclusion of harsh sanctions, however, set against the backdrop of
aggressive enforcement of copyright law against the likes of ThomasRasset and Tenenbaum, contributed to the success of the protests. Indeed,
studies show that individuals’ intuitions about what constitutes ethical
punishment of copyright infringement is directly connected to the level of
sanctions imposed. 63 While many people support warnings and fines, few
wish to see offenders disconnected from the Internet or put in jail. 64 Most
of the people who expressed support for fines in one study would have
limited them to below $100, which is vastly below the statutory penalties
S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
See H.R. 3261 § 102(c)(2)(A)-(D); S. 968, § 3(d)(B)-(D).
60
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62
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for copyright infringement. 65 Answers in this area were also sensitive to
the particular phrasing of survey questions, suggesting that the portrayal
of copyright issues in the media might have an important effect on
individuals’ perceptions and likelihood of taking political action. 66
The media may have also contributed to people’s existing biases
toward developing empathy for identifiable perceived victims of harsh
sanctions (as opposed to remote statistical victims). Thomas-Rasset,
Tenenbaum, and others became the faces of a struggle against large
corporate actors who, according to significant portions of the public,
suffered questionable economic harms. The SOPA/PIPA bills increased
individuals’ fears of what could happen if they themselves got caught
infringing, given how life-changing the pre-existing civil statutory
sanctions on the books already turned out to be for some.
The most prominent actor in the context of harsh sanctions, however,
was Aaron Swartz, an anti-SOPA activist that the DOJ later prosecuted for
his own involvement with copyright infringement. Swartz rose to tech
fame due to his roles in helping to form Reddit, the Creative Commons
Project, and OpenLibrary.org. 67 In 2011, in an effort to give the public free
access to subscription-only articles in the academic database JSTOR, he
broke into computer networks at M.I.T. by leaving a laptop connected to
the system in a closet and then downloading 4.8 million documents after
signing in under a false account. 68 His plan to release the documents failed
because he was caught by law enforcement. 69 Prosecutors charged him
with a total of thirteen criminal counts,70 and he faced up to thirty-five
years in prison as well as other consequences such as a fine of up to $1
million. 71 His likely prison sentence would have likely been in the
65
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neighborhood of seven years had a court convicted him, 72 but we will
never find out the exact figure because Aaron Swartz took his own life by
hanging before the case proceeded. 73
There is scholarly disagreement on the firmness of the legal foundation
of his prosecution. 74 As a more general matter, however, it is indeed likely
that many people today have engaged in behavior that would theoretically
fall under the purview of the criminal law. 75 Some policymakers and
scholars have suggested changes to the laws that made Swartz’s
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prosecution possible, 76 and there were bipartisan criticisms 77 and public
demonstrations after his death. 78 Many, including a number of
Congressmen, asked whether Swartz would have been prosecuted as
harshly but for his opposition efforts to SOPA, 79 which is a disconcerting
possibility for those concerned with free expression in our society. The
DOJ came under suspicion that it sought to make an example of Swartz
because he was a famous figure that angered the government when
criticizing SOPA and attempting to distribute documents to the public that
usually require individual payments through the PACER system. 80
The criminal law system relies on the fact that 95% of charged
individuals accept plea bargains. 81 Having large sanctions on the books
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ensures that this number remains high, but the question is at what cost. 82
Swartz was one of the few that did not want to “take the deal”—while he
worried about the possibility of prison, he was most concerned about being
branded a felon. 83 It is questionable whether the drafters of the criminal
laws that may have been used ultimately to convict Swartz envisioned
defendants like him. His case, and those of people like Thomas-Rasset and
Tenenbaum in the civil setting, shows that bills involving new criminal or
civil sanctions against offenders in the quickly developing world of
information reproduction and dissemination deserve special attention.
CONCLUSION
Patents and copyrights are both protected by the same constitutional
clause, and both regimes seek to incentivize the creation of more
intangible goods from which society will benefit. They both struggle with
defining how much an individual must add to the goods that preceded it
before protection kicks in, and with how best to punish legal violations.
Copyright law, like trademark law but unlike patent law, has chosen to
include the possibility of criminal sanctions. As this symposium piece
describes, this has come about for both utilitarian reasons and due to the
nature of the American public choice landscape. Copyright owners’ ability
to push for increased sanctions and enforcement has, however, hit some
roadblocks in recent times. Similarly to how tech companies have put up
an important obstacle to the expansion of patent infringement sanctions,
they—together with popular grassroots movements—have now drawn
lines in the copyright context. The future will show whether these
developments will eventually lead to greater convergence between
copyright enforcement and patent enforcement.

Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html.
82
Id.
83
David Amsden, The Brilliant Life and Tragic Death of Aaron Swartz, ROLLING STONE
(Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-brilliant-life-and-tragic-deathof-aaron-swartz-20130215; see also Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 13, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/aaron-swartzsuicide_b_2467079.html (questioning the government's need to press for felony charges
against Swartz). Swartz also drew parallels between his experience with the prosecution and
the tale that Franz Kafka describes in the novel “The Trial”.

